Supreme Court on Monday scrutinized the recent transfers of judges to the Islamabad High Court (IHC), with a five-member constitutional bench, led by Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, emphasizing that judicial involvement at four levels is mandatory in the transfer process even a single objection can halt it.
The hearing in the high-profile judicial transfer case was adjourned until Tuesday.
During the hearing, senior lawyer Faisal Siddiqi, representing the Karachi Bar, argued that judicial seniority was manipulated secretly, with overnight changes made to seniority lists through executive means — calling it a “usurpation of authority.”
Justice Mazhar asked Siddiqi whether Article 175-A had overridden Article 200 of the Constitution. Siddiqi responded that a judge’s seniority evolves over decades and cannot be altered overnight through transfers without due process. He maintained that even if a judge is transferred, the move remains temporary and cannot alter long-standing seniority.
Justice Mazhar reiterated that judge transfers require consensus from four judicial tiers: two chief justices of the concerned high courts, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, and the judge concerned. “If any one of them refuses, the transfer cannot proceed,” he said. “If everything were in the executive’s hands, it would be a different matter.”
Attorney General Mansoor Usman Awan clarified that judge transfers under Article 200 can be temporary or permanent. He said judges on temporary transfer receive certain benefits, whereas permanent transfers include government housing. He added that in the IHC case, no new appointments were made, and transferred judges retained their original terms without additional allowances.
When questioned about oaths and whether transferred judges’ original seats became vacant, Awan said the Constitution’s Third Schedule does not require a separate oath for IHC judges and that the same oath applies across all high courts.
Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan questioned why details on oaths and seniority were omitted from the initial summaries and why these were later clarified by the Law Secretary. Awan responded that the summaries were administrative in nature and that he would answer the court’s queries in detail.
The bench also questioned the tenure and contractual terms of the Law Secretary, seeking clarity on his involvement in defining judicial seniority.
